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PART I 
Introduction 
 
As the Internet rapidly gained popularity in the late 1990s, gambling Web sites began to take root, causing 
numerous social, financial, and political costs. These costs—including the creation of new gambling addicts, 
bankruptcies, and crime—directly resulted from the widespread proliferation and accessibility of gambling sites 
on the Internet. Policy-makers worldwide generally failed to identify the large socio-economic costs associated 
with Internet gambling, as well as the ability of Internet gambling and other forms of cyberspace gambling to 
destabilize local, national, and even international economies by disrupting financial institutions. 
At the turn of the 21st century, Internet gambling exemplified gambling in all cyberspace venues. At that 
time, Internet gambling promoters claimed that the federal “Wire Act,”1 which prohibits gambling by wire, did 
not apply to cyberspace gambling.2 Simultaneously, Internet gambling operators argued that, as a practical 
matter, cyberspace gambling could not be “banned.”3 Taken together, these arguments implied that cyberspace 
gambling could not be practically or functionally regulated. Legal scholars, however, almost universally agreed 
with the U.S. Department of Justice that Internet gambling violated the Wire Act.4 
Utilizing the basic meta-language model of the McDougal/Lasswell methodology of policy-oriented 
jurisprudence,5 this analysis confirmed the policy recommendation that all cyberspace and Internet gambling 
needed to be banned domestically in the United States and prohibited internationally by a United Nations 
multinational treaty because of their potential to destabilize regional, national, and global economies. 
                                                           
1 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). This federal statute prohibits one “engaged in the business of betting or wagering [from] 
knowingly us[ing] a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or 
information assisting in the plac[ement] of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest.” Id. § 1084(a). 
2 See generally NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 5-6 to -10 (June 1999), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT]. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 5-9 to -12. 
5 This particular article is summary in scope, but the authors conceived it within the penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell 
model for decision-making. In the areas of legal and government policy, which subsume strategic socio-economic and 
business concerns, post-legal realists formulated the classic decision-making models. In particular, Professor Myres 
McDougal and Professor Harold Lasswell postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a landmark 
article directed toward legal educators and law professors. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and 
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); see also John W. Kindt, An Analysis of 
Legal Education and Business Education Within the Context of a J.D./MBA Program, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-18 
(1981–82) (examining the legal realist movement); John W. Kindt, An Analysis of Legal Education and Business Education 
Within the Context of a J.D./MBA Programme, 13 LAW TEACHER 12, 14–16 (1979); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. 
McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971) (providing comprehensive goal criteria for a 
new theory about law); Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966) (examining 
interrelationships of law and public policy). The decision-making concepts introduced by Professors McDougal and 
Lasswell were later expanded to include international law and U.S. domestic law, as these areas interfaced with “policy-
oriented jurisprudence.” See John N. Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 
54 VA. L. REV. 662 (1968); Frederick Tipson, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human 
Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 535 (1973–74). 
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PART II 
Delimitation of Problems 
A. The Strategic Problems Associated with Gambling Issues 
After the legalization of casinos and gambling in New Jersey in the late 1970s, the amount of licensed gambling 
activity conducted within the United States grew exponentially.6 For decades, however, the Wire Act 
specifically prohibited the transmission of wagers by wire in either “interstate or foreign commerce.”7 In 1995, 
some enterprising gambling proponents claimed this statute did not apply to the Internet because of its virtually 
wireless nature.8 The U.S. Justice Department disagreed and maintained that “cyberspace casinos [in particular 
were] illegal.”9 
In addition, some promoters of Internet gambling began to try to skirt federal laws by establishing online 
casinos in remote offshore locations, primarily in the Caribbean.10 By 2000, at least twenty-five foreign 
jurisdictions had granted Internet gambling licenses.11 A Canadian man best exemplified this type of Internet 
gambling promoter when he promised in 1995 to build a “virtual strip” of casinos, available to Internet users 
merely at the touch of a button.12 If left unregulated, analysts expected these casinos—the future “Virtual 
Vegas”—to rapidly develop into a $10 billion per year industry.13 
During the late 1990s, experts, as well as sectors of the general public, became concerned with the possible 
social, economic, and political ramifications that could result from these technological developments, including 
the marked potential for an increase in the number of pathological (addicted) gamblers.14 In addition to socio-
economic ramifications, Internet gambling raised legal and regulatory issues that interlaced with the notions of 
freedom of speech, freedom of the Internet, and an individual’s freedom of choice. Practical issues of taxation, 
regulation, and competitive fairness further complicated these issues. 
Experts refer to the strategic problems associated with gambling activities, particularly government-
sanctioned gambling activities, as the ABCs of gambling, specifically: 
(1) New pathological (Addicted) gamblers, 
(2) New Bankruptcies, and  
(3) New Crime and Corruption.15 
                                                           
6 See NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, EXEC. SUMMARY 2 (June 1999), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html (stating that the U.S. gambling industry grew “tenfold” since 1975) 
[hereinafter NGISC EXEC. SUMMARY].  
7 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000). 
8 See, e.g., NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-4, 5-6 to -7. 
9 William M. Bulkeley, New On-Line Casinos May Thwart U.S. Laws, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1995, at B1, available at 1995 
WL-WSJ8710212. 
10 Id. 
11 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-1, -3. These jurisdictions included: “five territories within Australia, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, 
Grand Turk, Grenada, Honduras, the territory of Kalmykia in Russia, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Vincent, South Africa, Trinidad, Turks and Caicos Islands, four territories in the United Kingdom, Vanatu, and Venezuela.” 
Id. 
12 See Joshua Quittner, Betting on Virtual Vegas: To Get Around U.S. Gambling Laws, the First Online Casinos are Setting 
Up Their Card Tables Offshore, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 64, available at 1995 WL 9021026. 
13 Id. 
14 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-4, -5. 
15 See John Warren Kindt, U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: Greater 
than the Illegal Drug Problem?, Statement to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 2 (May 21, 1998), available 
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By 2001, the potential existed for these costs of Internet gambling ultimately to compound each other, leading 
to devastating results. 
In 1996, the U.S. press reported the viewpoint that de jure or de facto Internet “gambling [was] the fastest 
way to destroy the credibility of the Internet system.”16 Additionally, the press summarized one author’s 
opinion: “If you lose, you’ll lose, and if you win, you could lose because there’s no way to collect from these 
offshore operations.”17 Furthermore, the pervasiveness of personal computers at every workstation, in every 
school, and in every living room maximized the accessibility and acceptability of Internet gambling—
negatively impacting work productivity and financial systems. The online casinos became devastating 
enticements for the constantly growing numbers of pathological and problem gamblers in the United States and 
worldwide. “People will be trapped,” one author concluded.18 “They won’t be able to get away from it.”19 
1. Costs of Addictions 
“America is addicted to gambling—and doesn’t even know,” stated Bernie Horn, the 1996 political director of 
the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling (“NCALG”),20 a nonprofit watchdog organization similar to 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving. In support of this statement, Horn pointed to studies indicating that legalized 
gambling led to an increased problem of pathological gambling.21 For example, a 1995 study in Iowa 
determined that “after the state legalized casinos, 5.4% of the state’s adults, or 110,000 people, became 
pathological[, addicted, or problem] gamblers,” which represented a 200% increase.22 Before Iowa legalized 
riverboat casinos, only 1.7% of Iowans constituted pathological or problem gamblers.23 The criteria for 
diagnosing a pathological gambling disorder was first enumerated by the American Psychiatric Association in 
1980, and thereafter listed in subsequent editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV).24 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
at http://www.library.ucla.edu/libraries/mgi/campaign/1998gen/props/prop5/website-
no2/statements/john_kindt_1998_may_21.html [hereinafter U.S. and International Costs]. 
16 James Sterngold, A One-Armed Bandit Makes a House Calls [sic]; Virtual Casino is Coming, but Regulation is Still a Big 
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at D1 (quoting John W. Kindt). 
17 Id. (quoting John W. Kindt). 
18 Id. (quoting John W. Kindt). 
19 Id. (quoting John W. Kindt). 
20 Melissa Weinstein Kaye, Smooth Sailing is Expected for Gambling Commission, CONG. Q., July 20, 1996, at 2053. 
21 See Melissa Weinstein Kaye, Gambling: Across the Country…Most Popular Game in Town, CONG. Q., July 20, 1996, at 
2055. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31, at 615-
18 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The DSM-IV delimits pathological gambling as follows: 
A. Persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior as indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
(1) [I]s preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past gambling experiences, handicapping or 
planning the next venture, or thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble) 
(2) [N]eeds to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired excitement 
(3) [H]as repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling 
(4) [I]s restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling 
(5) [G]ambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness, 
guilt, anxiety, depression) 
(6) [A]fter losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing” one’s losses). 
(7) [L]ies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling 
(8) [H]as committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling 
(9) [H]as jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity because of 
gambling 
(10) [R]elies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation caused by gambling 
B. The gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic Episode. 
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To further compound the problems associated with widespread gambling on the Internet, experts 
discovered that the dangers of electronic gambling far exceed those of traditional “real-world” forms of 
wagering for the 1% to 3% of the public most vulnerable to gambling addictions.25 Howard Shaffer, Director of 
Harvard Medical School’s Division on Addictions, determined that the use of “[e]lectronics as a vehicle of 
administration for gambling activities changes the experience to make it more dependence producing.”26 Shaffer 
noted: “As smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience, I think electronics is going to change the 
way gambling is experienced.”27 For students and the digital generation in particular, this incarnation of 
gambling has “all the makings of a disaster,” as summarized by one Gamblers Anonymous (“GA”) member.28 
GA members warned that “Internet gambling [wa]s a solitary addiction,” noting that “[e]ven in action-filled 
casinos, [addicted/pathological] gamblers [tended to] isolate themselves from their surroundings.”29 “Online 
gambling [wa]s a further extension of this [isolation]….It [constituted] a way not to have to deal with any 
people, and it could be very secretive.”30 
As the 20th century ended, the Internet quickly evolved into an omnipresent factor around the world. In this 
context, psychiatrists and psychologists discovered a new obsession—“Internet Addiction.”31 As reported in 
2000, Dr. Kimberly Young, the executive director at the Center for On-Line Addiction, studied “496 heavy 
Internet users and compared their behavior to the clinical criteria used to classify gambling.”32 Young concluded 
that people with “‘Internet Addiction’ met four or more of the established criteria and found college students to 
be particularly at risk.”33 Apparently aware of this phenomenon, elements of the Internet gambling industry 
actively and blatantly looked to exploit it in order to maximize profits. For example, one popular 1995 Internet 
gambling site, called the Cozino, offered visitors the opportunity to play various games of chance online, and 
reportedly had arguably unethical plans to add self-acknowledged “addictive” entertainment in the future.34 An 
onscreen message stated: “If you are addicted to a particular casino game and would like to see (and play) it in 
the Cozino, please E-mail to the address below.”35 
2. Costs of Bankruptcies 
Presumably, the stereotypical gambling debt enforcer did not immediately concern online gamblers because 
when a player incurred losses online, those debts accrued on credit.36 Some sites even allowed gamblers to 
wager their house mortgages,37 highlighting that some industry elements obviously marketed to pathological 
(addicted) gamblers, as well as the extensive and pervasive nature of potential losses. These potentially 
extensive losses would adversely impact not only the gamblers who incurred them, but also their related 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Id. at 618. 
25 William H. Bulkeley, Feeling Lucky? Electronics is Bringing Gambling into Homes, Restaurants and Planes, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 16, 1995, at Al, available at 1995 WL-WSJ 9896153. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Gabriella Spinnato, Online Gambling: Legal, Enticing to College Students, DAILY FREE PRESS (Boston), Nov. 6, 2000, 
available at www.dailyfreepress.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=8076. Gamblers Anonymous programs parallel 
Alcoholics Anonymous programs and utilize a similar 12-step procedure. See Henry R. Lesieur, Socioeconomic Impacts and 
Public Policy: Costs and Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 158 (1998). 
29 Spinnato, supra note 28. 
30 Id. (quoting a GA member) (alteration in original). 
31 Alex Weininger, Doctors Disagree About Existence of Disorder Termed ‘Internet Addiction,’ DIGITAL COLLEGIAN (Penn.) 
(Oct. 11, 2000), at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2000/10/10-11-00tdc/10-11-00dnews-8.asp. 
32 Id. Gambling represented “the closest type of addiction to online addiction because it involve[d] failed impulse control 
without involving an intoxicant.” Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Quittner, supra note 12. 
35 Id. (emphasis added). 
36 See Spinnato, supra note 28. 
37 Id. 
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financial institutions. Viewed strategically, these economic impacts could destabilize financial infrastructures, 
particularly in developing economies with less stable financial systems. 
In addition to the personal bankruptcies made possible by Internet gambling, businesses also faced 
significant economic losses due to the presence and accessibility of Internet gambling in the workplace. In the 
1990s, businesses with Internet access started experiencing problems as their employees lost productive job 
time while “surfing the Net.”38 As workers began to engage in Internet gambling activities, the businesses lost 
not only productive labor time, but also company assets, as employees became hooked and started to steal from 
their employers to fund their addictions.39 
Sociologists almost uniformly reported that legalizing more forms of gambling (known as the 
“acceptability factor”) and making more forms of gambling available (known as the “accessibility factor”) lead 
to the creation of new pathological gamblers in the workforce, who engaged in “addictive behavior” pursuant to 
the DSM-IV.40 In one 1987 survey, even before widespread Internet use, pathological gamblers in Gamblers 
Anonymous were already reporting that 44% had stolen from their employers to gamble, 34% had been fired 
from work or had quit, 21% had filed for bankruptcy, and 18% had gambling-related arrests.41 
Legalized gambling activities on the Internet would maximize both the acceptability factor and the 
accessibility factor, creating new pathological gamblers by placing gambling activities in every household, 
proximate to children in schools, and at every employee’s work station—theoretically.42 This would create 
major numbers of new pathological gamblers, at an annual cost to society of $10,000 to $52,000 per 
pathological gambler.43 Sociologists indicated that the best blue-collar and white-collar employees, the Type-A 
personalities, were the most likely to become pathological gamblers, and most pathological gamblers engaged 
in property crimes, including embezzlement and fraud, to finance their gambling.44 Before the widespread use 
of the Internet, reports in 1987 already confirmed that pathological gambling accounted for 33% of all insurance 
                                                           
38 See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, The Web: New Ticket to a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at G1 (stating that dozens of 
employees are fired for surfing pornography and gambling sites); see Henry R. Lesieur, Experience of Employee Assistance 
Programs with Pathological Gamblers, 19 J. DRUG ISSUES 425, 427 (1989). 
39 For two examples of how employee theft resulted in significant losses in the financial industry see Laura Proctor, The 
Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure or a Failure of Supervision?, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 735, 741 (1997), examining the 
1995 collapse of Barings Bank following a $1 billion loss from an employee’s unauthorized use of company funds, and 
Andrew Pollack, U.S. Holds Trader in Bank’s Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at A1, discussing Daiwa Bank’s $1.1 
billion loss from an employee’s unauthorized trading. 
40 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Brett Pulley, Compulsive Gambling Spreads, Largely Due to Legality, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at A1; see generally Howard J. Shaffer et al., Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling 
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, Harvard Medical School, Div. on Addictions, Dec. 15, 1997, at 
107, app. 2; Press Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling 
Disorders in North America: Research Shows that Gambling Disorders Affect a Growing Number of Adults (Dec. 4, 1997), 
at http://www.hms.harvard.edu/news/releases/1297gambling.html (Based on studies conducted between 1977 and 1993, 
0.84 percent of adults were affected by a gambling disorder. But “the prevalence rate from 1994–1997 grew to 1.29 percent 
of the adult population.”). For a summary of the acceptability factor and the accessibility factor, see John W. Kindt, U.S. 
National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling 
Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 567, 581 (1995). 
41 John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco 
Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 17, tbls.A4, A8 & accompanying footnotes [hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits]; see 
also Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, SOCIETY, May–June 1992, at 43; Henry R. Lesieur, Pathological Gambling, 
Work, and Employee Assistance, 1 J. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE RES. 32, 32, 42-45 (1992); Henry R. Lesieur, Measuring the 
Costs of Pathological Gambling: Saying Too Much With Too Little, Address at the Nat’l Conf. on Gambling Behavior of 
the Nat’l Council on Problem Gambling (Sept. 1996). 
42 U.S. and International Costs, supra note 15, at 3, 18-19. 
43 See id. at 11-12, 16. These cost estimates were not adjusted to current year dollars. 
44 See id. at 10, 17; see also Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at 47 tbl.A8 and accompanying footnotes. 
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fraud, or $1.3 billion.45 The advent of Internet gambling created new technologies and new opportunities for 
gambling-related fraud.46 
One pathological employee gambler in a million-dollar company could easily bankrupt that business.47 
Reports confirmed substantial increases in the numbers of pathological gamblers and concomitant personal, 
professional, and business bankruptcies in those states and counties that, during the 1990s, allowed casinos and 
video gambling machines (“VGMs”). For example, a 1997 report sponsored by the American banking industry 
concluded that counties with accessibility to casino and video machine gambling had between 18% to 71% 
more business bankruptcies and personal bankruptcies than the national average—attributing these bankruptcies 
to gambling losses.48 The use of VGMs and other electronic gambling devices (“EGDs”) represented a 
substantial step toward Internet gambling. 
3. Costs of Crime 
While Hollywood often romanticizes gambling and its association with crime as something glamorous or 
socially acceptable, the real link between gambling and criminal activity deviates quite far from this innocuous 
portrayal. “Within three years after [casino] gambling was introduced to Atlantic City, the city experienced a 
tripling of total crime, rocketing from 50th to 1st in crime rate per capita.”49 Similarly, in a “before gambling” 
vis-à-vis “after gambling” example: 
[T]he state attorney’s office in Deadwood, South Dakota indicated that within two years 
after legalizing casino gambling, child abuse cases increased approximately 42%, domestic 
violence increased 80%, and burglaries and the writing of bad checks increased; overall, the 
town experienced a 50% increase in felonies and an 80-100% increase in law enforcement 
and police costs.50 
In addition to increases in specific categories of crime, an increased risk of white-collar crime also existed, 
predicated upon the ease with which gambling facilities laundered money.51 This factor, coupled with the 
anonymity of the Internet and lax supervision by government officials in certain countries hosting online 
casinos, resulted in a strong likelihood of criminal behavior eventually occurring.52 
As the explosion in the number of Internet casinos developed, U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as 
the U.S. State Department, concluded that countries combining lax Internet casino regulations with substantial 
privacy laws created a recipe for disaster.53 These factors theoretically allowed organized crime rings and drug 
cartels a safe haven to launder billions of dollars in illegal profits through the Antiguan offshore gambling 
establishments.54 “Antigua’s offshore banking [business]—established in the mid-1980s with only limited 
regulation—expanded rapidly in recent years….Unfortunately, inadequate regulation and vetting led to a surge 
                                                           
45 Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance Problems and Pathological Gambling, 3 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 123, 134 
(1987). 
46 See Unregistered Advisers Barred from ‘Net, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Sept. 5, 1996, at C8 [hereinafter 
Unregistered Advisers]. 
47 See Proctor, supra note 39, at 737-41, 750-52 & n.155; see also supra text accompanying note 39. 
48 SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997: DEMOGRAPHICS, CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, & 
SOLUTIONS 119-23 (1997). 
49 Cynthia R. Janower, Gambling on the Internet, 2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (1996), available at 
http://jcmc.huji.ac.il/vol2/issue2/janower.html (citing Robin Widgery, Warning: Legal Gambling is a Costly Game, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 23, 1994, available at 1994 WL 8794061). 
50 Id. 
51 See Internet Casinos Find a Haven in the Caribbean Islands, LAS VEGAS REV-J., Nov. 10, 1997, available at 1997 WL 
4557597 [hereinafter Casinos Find a Haven]. 
52 See id. (discussing Internet casinos based in Antigua and Barbuda). 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
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in questionable banking operations—a number with alleged links to Russian criminal elements,”55 declared a 
1997 U.S. State Department report on international money-laundering and narcotics organizations. “The 
growing potential for money laundering has been an increasing concern of both the U.S. and Antiguan 
governments,”56 the report concluded. 
Evidence of the direct relationship between gambling and crime also appeared in the United States. For 
instance, “[t]he former manager of [Virginia]’s third-largest charitable gambling [organization] pleaded 
guilty…to nine counts of embezzlement.”57 This case paralleled other charitable bingo corruption cases in 
Virginia, which resulted in embezzlement-related indictments against two former workers and guilty pleas or 
convictions on fraud-related charges for four others.58 Virginia’s charitable gambling operations experienced 
corruption so widespread that “four of the state’s 33 [most popular] games [suffered] from either criminal 
indictments and/or convictions against their officials.”59 
Another case involved “[a] veteran FBI agent who supervised an organized crime squad and placed 
substantial bets on sporting events with [the] people he was investigating.”60 He became hooked on gambling 
and eventually pled guilty to embezzling $400,000.61 
“My client had a gambling problem,” said Mark Schnapp, attorney for [the agent] Jerome 
R. Sullivan. 
. . . . 
Court documents show [the FBI agent] took kickbacks from informants [to finance his 
pathological gambling]. Those documents also show that [the agent] received death threats 
from an associate of the Lucchese crime family, . . . when he amassed $100,000 in gambling 
debts. 
According to agents who questioned Sullivan, the former agent said he first started 
placing $100 bets with people he was investigating while on an undercover organized crime 
assignment in Fort Lauderdale. 
[Thereafter, h]e increased his bets to “several thousands of dollars” over time. 62 
This scenario demonstrated a classic pattern of gambling into addiction and highlighted that anyone, even a 
trained professional, was vulnerable to the lure of pathological gambling. 
Gambling-related crime affected many people besides simply the criminal and the victim. Sociologists 
indicated that each pathological gambler affected at least seven, and up to seventeen, other people.63 The direct 
link between pathological gambling and the lives of other people may result in tragedy, such as in the case of 
the Michigan man who returned from Las Vegas “distraught over gambling debts” and killed his pregnant wife, 
his three children, and then himself.64 
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Pathological gamblers burdened society in a variety of respects. A compulsive gambler’s mean gambling 
debt can range anywhere from $52,000 to $92,000.65 Some economists argued that these “sterile transfers of 
money” simply resulted in expenditures elsewhere in the economy and did not constitute losses to the overall 
economy.66 Other economists, however, categorized these gambling debts as losses to the “productive” and 
high-multiplier-effect economy, as they involve transfers into the non-productive or less productive “gambling 
economy” with its concomitant social costs.67 A survey of Gambler’s Anonymous members revealed that 
approximately 47% had committed insurance-related fraud or thefts in which insurance companies were 
obligated to pay the victims.68 
4. Additional Social Costs 
Areas debating whether to legalize gambling should consider what these statistics suggest for the future.69 
Robert Goodman wrote in his book, The Luck Business, that gambling’s total social cost, calculated by 
combining the values of bankruptcies, crime, broken families, and treatment, totaled approximately $29 billion 
annually.70 By his accounting, these costs totaled twice the amount of the tax revenues generated annually from 
gambling, and other studies have reported even greater proportional losses.71 
“The law must keep [pace] with technology,” demanded U.S. Senator Jon Kyl at the initial 1997 hearing 
involving Internet gambling issues before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, 
and Government Information.72 As Chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator Kyl summarized that: 
[g]ambling is either heavily regulated or expressly prohibited in the states. On the Internet, it 
is neither. Given the tremendous potential for abuse, addiction, and access by minors, online 
gambling should be prohibited. My bill will protect children from logging on to the family 
computer, “borrowing” the family credit card, and losing the family home, all before their 
parents get home from work. And for those people with a gambling problem, my bill will 
make it harder to gamble away the family paycheck. 
. . . . 
. . . Gambling erodes values of hard work, sacrifice, and personal responsibility. 
Although the social costs of gambling are difficult to quantify, research indicates they are 
potentially staggering. Gambling is a growing industry in the United States, with [wagering] 
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approaching $550 billion last year [1996]—three times the revenues of General Motors Corp. 
In 1993, more Americans visited casinos than attended a major league baseball game.73 
The erosion of hard work that Senator Kyl referenced was traceable to the fact that an increase in gambling-
oriented Internet sites could negatively impact the workplace in many U.S. corporations.74 Employee gambling 
on the Internet represented a serious corporate problem for the 21st century according to Dr. David Greenfield 
of the Center for Internet Studies and the author of Virtual Addiction.75 “Companies that provide Internet access 
to gambling sites may incur substantial employee productivity losses….In extreme cases, this may increase the 
potential for liability from the negative consequences an employee may incur—including compulsive 
[pathological] gambling problems and financial losses.”76 
An increase in gambling addictions could also impact health care costs, since pathological gamblers are 
more likely to have problems with alcohol77 and also evidence a suicide rate that is five to ten times higher than 
that of the national average.78 If society decided to rehabilitate gambling addicts, the total cost would range 
between $17,000 and $42,000 per person (in 1993 dollars).79 The national cost of pathological gambling in 1996 
was therefore estimated to be $56 billion per year.80 
B. The Proliferation of the Internet and Online Gambling 
In 1999, the United Nations Development Programme’s (“UNDP”) Human Development Report catalogued the 
rapid spread of Internet usage, establishing the United States as the leading country with 88.9 Internet hosts per 
1000 people according to 1998 data.81 Other leading countries included: Norway, 71.8; Australia, 42.7; 
Switzerland, 27.9; and the United Kingdom 23.3 (1995 U.K. data).82 
Between August 1995 and April 1999, Internet usage in North America grew from 18 million to 92 million 
users.83 In 1994, an amazing 30% of U.S. public elementary schools and 49% of secondary schools already had 
access to the Internet.84 Only 5 years later in 1999, the total rose to 95% overall, with 94% of elementary 
schools and 98% of secondary schools having Internet access.85 
Financial experts estimated that electronic technology would lead to increases in overall gambling 
revenues, which had already increased significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s. By 1995, “John Malone, 
president of cable-television [company] Tele-Communications, Inc. . . . called gambling one of the ‘killer 
applications’ for interactive networks,”86 and he implied that gambling partially justified the cost of developing 
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the information highway. “Though still in its infancy, [by 1997, online gambling constituted] a $200-million-a-
year business,”87 available on approximately 36 Internet sites. Considering that the annual amount gambled in 
America already totaled $550 billion, the growth potential became “obvious for virtual casinos and Internet 
sports betting”88 (the “gateway” gambling venue considered especially tempting to teens).89 Gambling online 
quickly became one of the most rapidly growing industries of the Internet, boasting annual revenues of $1.2 
billion in 1999, an increase of 80% from 1998.90 By 2002, it had the possibility of becoming a $3 billion 
industry, according to the international investment bank, Bear Stearns.91 
By 2000, nearly 700 Web sites offered online gambling to users, an industry anticipated “to grow from 
$1.1-billion in 1999 to $3-billion in 2002,”92 according to conservative estimates by the online gambling 
industry. In 2000, a survey of Internet users showed that “1-million Americans gamble online each day, and that 
4.5-million Americans—about 5% of those with access to the Internet—have gambled online.”93 According to 
Websense Inc., a computer company that instructs corporations on how to manage their employees’ Internet 
usage, the number of gambling-oriented sites jumped “from 6,992 in August 1999 to more than 21,651 as of 
August 2000.”94 This constituted a 209% increase through the course of one year, increasing 136% alone from 
February 2000 until August 2000.95 An Internet search in November 2000 on the search engine Google.com 
yielded approximately 2.4 million sites matching the term “gambling,” and approximately 43,800 sites 
matching the phrase “Internet gambling.”96 In September 2001, less than one year later, there were still about 
2.4 million sites matching the term “gambling” on Google.com, but the number matching “Internet gambling” 
had jumped to 522,000.97 
Jerry Fiddler, a University of Illinois alumnus and a co-founder of the Wind River Systems software 
company, addressed University of Illinois students at the Sixth Annual Student Computing Conference. 
“‘What’s the Internet going to look like in 10 years? I guarantee it won’t look like it does today,’ Fiddler told 
the audience.”98 He predicted that by 2010, one trillion devices would be connected to the Internet.99 
Gambling used to involve secretive dealings with unscrupulous bookmakers, or concerted trips to the dog 
or horse track, or to Atlantic City or Las Vegas.100 By 1995, however, the Internet broadened access to 
gambling, making it almost ubiquitous. Speculators used modern computers to extend the reach of gambling—
often frustrating regulators.101 Technology’s biggest impact on the gambling industry could be inviting 
gambling into the home—which International Gaming and Wagering Business, a gambling industry trade 
publication, referred to as “gaming’s new frontier.”102 Libertarians sometimes argued that if Internet users chose 
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to risk their money on unregulated Internet gambling with strangers in a foreign land, they got what they 
deserved when cheated.103 Internet gambling, however, had another insidious aspect. “Unchecked, it ha[d] the 
[very real] potential to turn every family room[, office, and school] in America with a . . . computer into an 
unregulated casino,”104 according to former Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey, III. Thereby, 
Internet gambling could send billions of U.S. dollars to dubious foreign jurisdictions (including terrorist 
organizations), potentially making Internet gambling a national security issue. 
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PART III 
Clarification of Goals 
A. Overall Goals in Legalized Gambling Issues 
In gambling issues, the overall strategic goals for government should be to conform to the common-law 
principle of maximizing the public health, safety, and welfare. In this context, the major goals for governmental 
authorities and decision-makers should be as follows: 
(1) minimize the social impacts of pathological (addicted) gamblers; 
(2) improve the public’s overall economic well-being (particularly the poor, the elderly and the 
disadvantaged), and encourage business/economic development; 
(3) repress and punish criminal activities; 
(4) promote ethical governmental practices in decision-making; 
(5) foster a first-rate education system and an educated public; and  
(6) maximize societal quality-of-life. 
In 2000, it appeared that eliminating illegal gambling on the Internet could prove impossible, but there 
existed mechanisms by which it could be legally discouraged and diminished—if existing criminal justice 
authorities chose to exercise their police discretion and take action. Some postulated that criminal justice 
authorities could and should initiate “sting” operations, whereby undercover police agents establish accounts 
with Internet gambling operations (i.e., to “follow the money”), and then get federal indictments against Internet 
gambling providers.105 The chilling effect on Internet gambling would be dramatic, and even offshore 
companies would be severely limited by a federal indictment. Furthermore, since U.S. federal statutes apply to 
international communications, a fortiori the legal impact would be substantial.106 As a practical matter, a sting 
operation is relatively easy and inexpensive to institute. Police agents simply log on to various gambling Web 
sites, establish customer gambling accounts, and then gamble illegally.107 In the United States, Missouri 
Attorney General Jeremiah “Jay” Nixon used this procedure to support a lawsuit seeking to prohibit illegal 
Internet gambling from the Coeur d’Alene Native American reservation in Idaho.108 
From a social perspective, the accessibility of gambling on the Internet placed an addictive behavior in the 
hands of millions of previously unexposed people, including adolescents and impressionable children. A 
majority of the money generated by Internet casinos went untaxed, created more untaxable money flow, and 
reduced taxable economic activities.109 Concomitantly, the potential social damages of “maximized 
accessibility” via in-home gambling alarmed sociologists, criminologists, and even the pre-existing U.S. 
gambling industry.110 
Some experts also argued that the Internet was incompatible with censorship and could not be regulated.111 
They noted that its users “fiercely protect[ed] their freedom and [would] sabotage any efforts at censorship.”112 
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The Internet, however, like any other highway, needed limits. Since the system failed to discipline itself, it 
appeared destined for government regulation or prohibition. 
B. Secondary Goals in Legalized Gambling Issues 
The secondary goals involved in legalized gambling issues and of importance to governmental authorities could 
be categorized as follows: 
(1) taxes—minimize the taxes necessary to achieve societal-governmental goals; 
(2) jobs—create new jobs and economic wealth throughout the economy; and 
(3) economic development—foster net new regional and/or strategic economic activity and not just a 
“sterile transfer of money.”113 
Internet gambling challenged the promotion of these goals by allowing the potentially rapid transfer of wealth 
from pre-existing productive economies with high-multiplier effects into non-productive or less productive 
gambling venues. Additional challenges resulted from the ability of Internet gambling activities to transfer 
billions of dollars to overseas jurisdictions—including illegal international organizations. 
C. Regulation of Internet Gambling 
“The Internet has taken the gambling world by storm,” testified Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General Alan 
Kesner, before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (“1999 Gambling Commission”).114 “One of 
the most heavily regulated industries in the world has crashed with full force into one of the most unregulated, 
and inherently unregulatable, phenomenon of modem times,” concluded Kesner.115 Montana Attorney General 
Joe Mazurek further noted that “[w]e have been cautious in our approach to gambling, but [Internet gambling] 
turns it all upside down….Our policy concern is that we lose control. We have no ability to protect our citizens 
or the existing businesses that have operated by our rules.”116 
Furthermore, serious concerns surfaced in the specific area of sports gambling on the Internet, particularly 
as the “gateway” gambling venue for teens and preteens. Representing the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”) before a hearing convened by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information, Bill Saum endorsed the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, 
stating, “As the number of online sports-betting sites continues to grow abroad, it is essential that the United 
States send a clear message that…it will be a violation of federal law to accept bets over the Internet.”117 
From the international perspective, in 1999 an Australian parliamentary committee recommended several 
measures to make online gambling less accessible, addressing the Prime Minister’s concern that pathological 
and problem gambling ills could destroy thousands of Australian lives.118 The parliamentary committee initiated 
the inquiry when an official report confirmed that “Australia had one of the world’s highest rates of gambling 
and found that 300,000 of its 19 million people had [gambling problems].”119 The Australian national 
government, expressing concern about problem gambling, announced plans to enact legislation “to stop the 
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nation’s six states and two territories from issuing any more [gambling] licenses for a year while it [considered] 
the social and economic costs of [Internet] gambling.”120 The announcement spurred “a rush by defiant states 
and Australia’s richest man Kerry Packer”121 to get Internet gambling operations up faster, resulting in the 
issuance of seven licenses in the week after the proposal. Emulating a common gambling industry scare tactic 
utilizing economic arguments without basis, Steve Toneguzzo, chairman of the Internet Industry Association 
online gambling taskforce, publicly stated that “[i]f Australia was to ban Internet gambling, those looking to 
establish in Australia would simply move offshore, taking jobs and the potential of US$9 billion by 2003 in 
export dollars.”122 
D. The Promised Economic “Benefits” of Typical Gambling Establishments and Their Absence from 
Internet Gambling Operations 
“Too often, public officials view gambling as a quick and easy way to raise revenues, without focusing on 
gambling’s hidden social, economic, and political costs,”123 President Clinton wrote to U.S. Senator Paul Simon 
in a 1995 letter endorsing his legislation to establish the National Gambling Impact Study Commission to study 
the various impacts of widespread legalized gambling. However, the claimed “new revenues” from gambling 
operations did not materialize when the operation involved Internet gambling.124 Online casinos cost almost 
nothing to build or maintain when compared to their brick-and-mortar counterparts. In addition, Internet 
gambling operations neither employed the numbers of people employed by conventional casinos, nor paid 
regular taxes. 
One Web site that featured a NCAA tournament betting pool cost only $225,000 to create and earned its 
money through advertising.125 The Internet’s first virtual casino, Internet Casinos, Inc. (“ICI”), reportedly 
opened for business on August 18, 1995, and offered 18 different casino games, plus online participation in the 
National Indian Lottery, as well as the planned development of an Internet sports book.126 While it generally 
might cost $300 million or more to build a totally new resort-style casino employing thousands, ICI developed 
its online casino for only $1.5 million and created only 17 new jobs.127 ICI’s founder, Warren B. Eugene, stated 
that his “house” cut usually averaged around 24%, compared to “the typical U.S. casino house take,” which 
fluctuated between 8% and 16% of every dollar wagered.128 National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling 
(“NCALG”) political director Bernie Horn summarized, “There are virtually no jobs created and there’s no tax 
revenue derived.”129 He added that cyberspace gambling, exemplified by Internet gambling, “creates kind of a 
black hole for people’s money.”130 
Under legislation passed in 1997, Antigua and Barbuda began charging just $100,000 a year for an Internet 
casino license, or $75,000 for telephone gambling operations.131 Antigua and Barbuda thereby guaranteed 
minimum governmental regulation and interference, maximum anonymity, as well as a totally tax-free profit.132 
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Antigua and Barbuda also had no capital gains taxes or income taxes.133 This government discouraged outside 
scrutiny, even when coming from its own citizens.134 Throughout the 1990s, the Antiguan and Barbudan 
government “licensed at least 57 offshore banks and at least two major sports-[gambling businesses], and only 
[the government knew] the names and assets of their owners.”135 
Similar to certain other forms of gambling, Internet casinos provided comparatively little revenue for their 
host jurisdictions, disappointing local residents with false hopes and broken promises of a rejuvenated economy. 
For example, while there were over 200 Indian casinos in the United States in 1997, apparently 40% of all 
Indian gambling revenues went to only eight casinos.136 
E. Goals Recommended by the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommended four different methods to prevent the 
proliferation of, and discourage participation in, illegal Internet gambling in the United States.137 
First, the 1999 Gambling Commission recommended that the federal government, through the actions of 
the President, Congress, and the Department of Justice, should prohibit “Internet gambling not already 
authorized [in 1999] within the United States or among parties in the United States and any foreign 
jurisdiction,”138 without permitting new exemptions or the extension of current federal exemptions to other 
jurisdictions. 
Second, the 1999 Gambling Commission recommended legislation to prohibit wire transfers to recognized 
Internet gambling sites, or to the offshore banks that represent them.139 Additionally, the Commission 
recommended legislation to render any credit card debts generated by Internet gambling unenforceable and 
unrecoverable to the credit lending companies.140 
Third, the 1999 Gambling Commission highlighted that the Internet’s ubiquitous nature and widespread 
accessibility from schools, homes, and offices allowed gambling without requiring the participant’s physical 
presence in a casino.141 Acknowledging a shortage of conclusive evidence proving the social costs of this new 
form of gambling, the Commission recommended that the states not allow the expansion of gambling into 
schools, offices, and homes through the use of newly developed technology and the practice of account 
wagering.142 
Finally, the 1999 Gambling Commission concluded that since the majority of Internet gambling 
proliferated most rapidly in and from foreign “host” countries, the federal government should begin 
encouraging or enabling those offshore governments not to promote or harbor Internet gambling operations that 
made their services available to U.S. citizens.143
                                                           
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Tribes Finding it Hard to Reap Windfall from Internet Gaming, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 1, 1997, at D4, available at 
1997 WL 4557597. 
137 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-12. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
 17 
PART IV 
Historical Background 
A. The Strategic Historical Implications of Legalized Gambling Activities 
While individualized gambling activities existed throughout the history of mankind, government-sanctioned 
gambling activities historically resulted in negative socio-economic conditions, far outweighed by any positive 
results.144 Furthermore, gambling activities essentially constituted a “sterile transfer of wealth,” which not only 
replaced, but actually hindered, genuine economic growth.145 The opportunity cost to those governments that 
legalized gambling activities consisted, in part, of lost “consumer dollars.”146 While the introduction of 
gambling-oriented dollars into a local economy arguably had a multiplier effect, by the 1990s a growing body 
of evidence existed showing that in most economic scenarios the multiplier associated with consumer dollars 
lost by redirection to gambling activities exceeded the gambling multiplier.147 
Accordingly, governments experimented with legalized gambling activities throughout history, sometimes 
referred to as “waves” of gambling, but as the public became re-educated to the socio-economic negatives, 
governments invariably re-criminalized and suppressed gambling activities.148 Sometimes social movements, 
including but not exclusively involving ethical and religious support from Judeo-Christian and Muslim 
elements, supported governmental activities to recriminalize gambling.149 Unlike most governmental 
authorities, these ethical religious elements often had extensive historical records and traditions highlighting the 
folly of gambling activities—particularly government-sanctioned gambling.150 
With shorter institutional memories, misguided governmental organizations periodically sanctioned various 
forms of gambling—often prompted by the lure of “painless” governmental revenues without additional 
taxation.151 However, within a period of years, governmental authorities usually relearned the painful socio-
economic lessons already ingrained with economic historians. In this context, modern economists often 
paraphrase Georg Hegel: “Those who forget the economic lessons of history, are condemned to relive them.”152 
B. The 1990s Proliferation of Offshore Online Casinos 
Internet Casinos, Inc. (“ICI”), the world’s first online casino, opened for business on August 18, 1995, with a 
total of 18 different casino-style games and also provided Internet access to the National Indian Lottery.153 In 
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1998, two primary types of Internet gambling Web sites existed.154 One type required the user to download 
special software to play, while the other allowed immediate online gambling using games created with the Java 
computer language.155 These Web sites required users to create accounts either by providing credit card 
information156 or by actually opening an offshore bank account.157 Additionally, the Web sites required users to 
pick a user name and password.158 During the 1990s, most Internet gambling sites had a minimum transaction 
amount ranging anywhere between $20 and $500.159 
While casino-style gambling initially favored a medium like the Internet, in 2000, the horse racing industry 
prepared to test market a means of gambling that merged “television, telephones and the Internet.”160 Executives 
in the horse racing industry argued that merging these technologies would cultivate “a new generation of fans,” 
watching races from their living rooms on their television sets while using the Internet to gather information on 
horses and to place their bets.161 
With developing Internet technology spreading across the globe, the gravitation of Internet gambling Web 
sites to the Caribbean and Central American countries resulted in part from (1) the relatively minimal fees that 
those countries charged to establish such operations; (2) the fact that those countries legalized Internet 
gambling; and (3) the largely unregulated atmosphere perpetuated by those governments.162 “Everyone says it’s 
a banana republic over there, and no one will regulate,”163 summarized Kerry Rogers, who ran an offshore 
operation known as WagerNet. Another Internet gambling site operator, Bob Ermian, who reportedly worked as 
a Boston bookie for 11 years prior to moving to the West Indies, explained, “The reason I’m here in this country 
is because I can’t do what I want to do in the U.S…..It feels great. I don’t have to worry about the police 
coming and breaking the door down.”164 
Warren Eugene, a citizen of Canada who operated an Internet gambling site out of the Caribbean, claimed 
that he felt secure from prosecution by any U.S. agencies.165 However, his Web site, ICI, warned Americans: 
At this time you may not be legally able to gamble at this casino site. Call your local 
authorities and check to see if you can enjoy our casino. If not, call and complain to your 
senators, congressmen, and attorney generals! Democracy does exist in America. Do not let 
your first amendmant [sic] and constitutional rights be taken away from you! Act Now!166 
Images representing American democratic ideals followed this disclaimer, as did additional pleadings to help 
change U.S. law.167 This site only allowed U.S. residents to use the site if they agreed to establish an offshore 
bank account, which then qualified them as “no longer Americans,” according to Eugene and his attorneys.168 
However, many users of gambling Web sites played for fun without wagering any money, making it difficult 
for authorities to enforce U.S. laws.169 
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C. Unfair Odds and Other Potential Frauds at Internet Gambling Sites 
Internet and cyberspace gambling presented obstacles, not only because of their accessibility and wide ranging 
acceptability, but also because of their “virtual” nature, especially when combined with an offshore location.170 
Offshore virtual casinos had no significant incentive to refrain from manipulating the odds in their favor 
because they operated without any regulatory supervision.171 Although computerized gambling could 
technically generate more random play and therefore be less susceptible to forms of cheating like card counting, 
player protection required that the software used in Internet gambling also be secure from potential alteration.172 
Steve Bourie, a former gambling industry executive for over twenty-five years, warned gamblers that a casino 
operator only had to remove a few 10-value cards from any standard deck to dramatically increase the house’s 
advantage over a player.173 “Since players don’t get to examine the deck how do they know all 52 cards are 
there?” he queried.174 Quasi-government authorities supposedly regulated video gambling machines used in real 
(as distinguished from “virtual”) casinos, insuring that the machines generate the established odds (but not 
necessarily “fair odds”) by limiting access to the machines, monitoring accounting and revenues generated by 
the machines, and keeping the electronic specifications tightly regulated.175 
Despite questions concerning the states’ ability to maintain the efficacy and integrity of state-sanctioned 
gambling activities and regulations (as well as who determined what was “fair” as states changed the odds more 
in the owners’ favor), generally states authorizing such activities tried to provide standards and concomitant 
regulation.176 The gambling industry euphemistically termed this process as “maintaining the integrity of the 
games.”177 Even so, when U.S. states initially sanctioned gambling activities, they attempted to provide some 
regular standards—although those standards generally deteriorated over time.178 Nevada, for example, 
implemented a certification requirement for all video gambling machine service personnel, which included a 
background check.179 Montana used security seals on the logic boards of all machines to prevent and detect 
tampering.180 Offshore Internet gambling operations, however, did not employ these types of protections. “All 
of these [Internet gambling] sites say they offer honest games, but in reality you’ll never know if that’s true,”181 
concluded Steve Bourie. Some sites tried self-regulation to assuage public fear, using accounting firms to 
monitor their activities.182 Although good for public relations, this type of voluntary self-regulation lacked the 
quasi-security of government regulation.183 
The honesty of the Web site operators themselves did not solely determine the honesty of Internet 
gambling. Computer hackers could infiltrate the systems and change the algorithm to boost payouts or even 
steal the credit card numbers from other users’ accounts.184 Aware of this security problem, Web site 
administrators admonished users to guard their passwords.185 In the eventuality that a hacker illegally obtained 
another person’s credit card information, of course, the offshore sites claimed that they could not be held 
responsible.186 
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The potential for fraud and other crimes latent in Internet gambling operations may have seemed minimal 
upon initial consideration, but closer examination revealed the vulnerability of the whole system.187 In 1996, 
Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III summarized these problems: 
Same scams, different medium. That’s what I thought as I perused the Internet on my home computer one 
sleepless night…and found the same kind of phony cancer cures and get-rich-quick schemes I have prosecuted 
for years under state consumer fraud laws. 
But nothing quite grabbed my attention like the Internet gambling sites—virtual casinos touting the 
convenience of gambling right in the home or office.188 
“From the days of Bugsy Siegel, casinos worldwide have been ripe grounds for money laundering,”189 
concluded Charles Intriago, ex-federal prosecutor and publisher of the Money Laundering Alert newsletter. 
Looking to major problems in the future, he predicted that Native American casinos would become increasingly 
problematic and noted that “[w]ith the proliferation of Indian casinos, there’s more opportunity [for money 
laundering].”190 When comparing the less-regulated nature of the offshore Internet sites to the scant regulation 
in American Indian gambling operations, the possibilities for money laundering increased dramatically. 
A 1996 Commodity Futures Trading Commission statement highlighted some commercial concerns by 
concluding that “[t]he Internet and the Web enable unscrupulous operators to commit fraud or other violations 
of federal commodity futures laws with virtual anonymity, and then disappear quickly into cyberspace, leaving 
behind little or no evidence of wrongdoing.”191 By 1997, the Federal Trade Commission warned over 500 Web 
sites about the operation of “potentially illegal pyramid schemes,” and filed 15 separate lawsuits with 
allegations of online scams.192 One particular lawsuit, filed by Attorney General Dennis Vacco in the New York 
Supreme Court, charged that World Interactive Gaming Corp. of Bohemia, N.Y. raised almost $2 million 
through “illegal solicitations” of “unknowing investors by means of false representations, omissions of material 
facts, use of unregistered salespeople and other fraudulent and deceptive practices. “193 
“Another big problem with Internet casinos [wa]s the risk of not getting paid,”194 said one former casino 
executive. “A story about one of the worst incidents was posted on a web site [in 1998] where an operator 
wouldn’t pay off on a $25,000 roulette win because they said there was a ‘glitch’ in the software.”195 
Other concerns revolve around privacy issues and invasive “cookies.” Cookies are the equivalent of ID 
cards used by Web sites to identify users and gather information about them such as their Web browsing 
habits.196 These cookie systems can store vast amounts of information on a user’s computer and also distribute 
the information to others without the user’s knowledge or consent.197 Cookies can also learn the passwords and 
credit card numbers of unsuspecting Internet users.198 This can create a particular hazard when dealing with 
offshore Web sites such as gambling sites, where both passwords and credit card numbers are used. 
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The first and most highly publicized U.S. prosecution of an Internet gambling site was that of World Sports 
Exchange.199 Jay Cohen, co-owner of the company, was once a self-appointed spokesperson for the industry, 
eager to discuss his offshore gambling enterprise based in Antigua.200 He gave many interviews, submitted 
testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on possible methods to regulate online casinos, and even 
publicly debated the attorney general of Wisconsin on CNBC.201 In 1998, the U.S. indicted Cohen and 21 co-
defendants on charges alleging their involvement in illegal offshore betting operations.202 By August 2000, ten 
defendants pled guilty to conspiring to break wagering laws, three defendants pled guilty to relating 
misdemeanors, and seven of those indicted, including World Sports Exchange director of wagering and vice 
president Steve Schillinger, remained fugitives from the law.203 All of the defendants were charged with 
violating the Federal Wire Act of 1961,204 which made using telephone lines for wagering purposes illegal.205 
The defense planned to portray “Cohen and Schillinger as young entrepreneurs” who got their start working 
as traders on the Pacific Stock Exchange when they first envisioned running an Internet gambling site.206 They 
realized the potential for a lucrative Internet gambling service after Schillinger gained notoriety “by selling 
options on the verdict of the O.J. Simpson trial.”207 In fact, Schillinger reportedly left the Exchange under threat 
of permanent “banishment in 1996 after exchange officials” learned that he was “running a sports betting 
operation from the floor.”208 The other defendants charged also planned to argue that since the Internet did not 
exist in 1961, the Wire Act did not apply to it.209 Despite these types of defensive arguments, Cohen was 
convicted and sentenced to 21 months in prison plus a $5,000 fine.210 Similarly, in 2000, the first case was filed 
“in Nevada for Internet gambling violations” against American Wagering, Inc., which “agreed to pay a fine” of 
$10,000.211 Furthermore, the company agreed to sell its business based in Australia that allegedly allowed users 
to place illegal sports bets.212 
D. The Interests of Nevada and the Gambling Industry Regarding Internet Gambling 
Since their inception in the mid 1990s, the number of Internet casinos has skyrocketed. Only 15 such sites 
existed in 1996, burgeoning to over 700 by 2000.213 According to gambling industry research, the 
approximately 200 companies that owned and operated Internet gambling sites generated revenues estimating 
almost $1.5 billion in 2000, and $3 billion by 2002.214 To put these amounts into perspective, according to the 
gambling industry’s lobbying group, the American Gaming Association (“AGA”), the 450 commercial casinos 
in the United States generated revenues of $20 billion in 1998, and the 160 Indian casinos generated $7.2 billion 
in revenues.215 
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In 1998, the Nevada Resort Association publicly stated their official position opposing the expansion of 
gambling on the Internet.216 According to Wayne Mehl, a representative in Washington, D.C. for the Nevada 
Resort Association, Las Vegas casinos were not interested in the Internet, and he was unaware of any casinos 
attempting to diversify into the world of online gambling.217 He stated that “[o]ur board unanimously adopted a 
resolution opposing the expansion of gaming on the Internet because they don’t feel it is appropriately regulated 
at this time.”218 Harrah’s president, Hector Mon, expressed similar sentiments when addressing the issue of 
Internet gambling.219 He conveyed his uncertainty and reluctance as a function of the lack of regulations 
employed to monitor Internet gambling.220 “[T]here are so many issues related to the fact this industry is 
unregulated, uncontrolled and illegal based on the regulatory framework within which we are controlled,” he 
said.221 Also in 1998, Frank Fahrenkopf, the AGA’s main lobbyist, testified before a U.S. Congressional hearing 
and indicated that the gambling industry opposed the expansion of Internet gambling.222 He expressed concern 
that gambling-oriented Web sites could easily get around federal and state laws that constrain conventional 
gambling operations in the United States.223 
In 2000, U.S. Representative James A. Gibbons (R-Nev.) argued to Congress that: “In states like Nevada, 
the gaming industry is well regulated, and its activities are tightly monitored. However, allowing gambling to be 
allowed on the Internet would open the floodgates for corruption, abuse and fraud.”224 Arguing on behalf of 
Nevada interests and the AGA, Representative Gibbons pushed for a practical ban on Internet gambling during 
the floor debate in the U.S. House of Representatives.225 
Internet gambling presented a difficult dilemma for U.S. casino operators.226 They viewed the enormous 
profit potential of Internet gambling, but worried that Internet gambling would cannibalize their pre-existing 
multi-million-dollar gambling operations.227 During the late 1990s, U.S. casino operators almost uniformly 
favored banning Internet gambling; however, by 2000, they became more divided between banning Internet 
gambling and rushing into their own Internet gambling operations, with many gambling interests unsure of 
which approach to take.228 U.S. casino operators wanted to prevent new Internet competitors from invading 
their niche, but they also tried to hedge their bets by establishing a means to get in on the action and the Internet 
money themselves.229 “We’d be crazy not to view this as an opportunity for the company,”230 announced Phil 
Cooper, a vice-president of Caesars Palace in Las Vegas. 
This sort of reluctant acceptance after the initial opposition and skepticism toward Internet gambling 
operations left many gambling officials in Nevada uncertain. Steve DuCharme, the Chairman of the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board, said in 1999 that as long as gambling companies based in Nevada restricted their 
Internet gambling services to jurisdictions where it was legal, there would be no violations of the rules of the 
Board.231 However, this equivocation resounded like a convenient changing of the rules to increase company 
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profits at the expense of public health, safety, and welfare. In any event, the Gaming Control Board uncovered a 
troubling situation when evaluating the renewals of licensees with interests in the online gambling industry. In 
2000, the Board determined that some of the most powerful and prolific individuals and companies involved in 
legal, licensed Nevada gambling were becoming involved in Internet gambling ventures.232 The biggest concern 
among the Nevada Gaming Control Board was that federal action against an illegal offshore Internet betting 
establishment maintained by an entity with a Nevada state gambling license could seriously tarnish the state’s 
reputation for upholding regulatory mechanisms.233 
In the mid-1990s, a magazine dedicated to Internet gambling, Rolling Good Times On-Line, was 
established.234 Editor Sue Schneider became involved in the attempts to legitimize Internet gambling.235 She 
contributed to the formation of the Interactive Gaming Council (“IGC”), an informal organization of gambling 
Web site operators who claimed that they could regulate and sanction themselves, in an effort to establish 
credibility and trust with potential online bettors.236 These Internet operators lobbied for regulations to help 
maintain fairness and honesty among the industry, instead of outright prohibition.237 Exemplifying the efforts to 
espouse the virtues of Internet gambling, Schneider argued that “[t]here are three casinos a mile from my (St. 
Louis) office,”238 adding, “I can do a whole lot of damage on my bank account, and nobody would be the 
wiser.”239 However, she justified, “[w]ith the Internet, [the flow of money is] all traceable.”240 While this 
argument was an interesting exercise in public relations, monies gambled on the Internet were obviously less 
“traceable” than monies from U.S. bank accounts, which were subject to U.S. legal discovery procedures in the 
event of litigation.241 These types of arguments and efforts to build consumer support for Internet gambling 
operations led to questions involving what interests were financing the start-up costs for Rolling Good Times 
Online and the IGC.242 
E. The Interests of Opponents to Internet Gambling 
There were as many different sorts of people interested in preventing the spread of Internet gambling, as there 
were reasons to do so. Religious organizations opposed gambling on social and moral grounds; casino, hotel, 
and restaurant owners, as well as others in the hospitality industry, all worried about losing visitors to their 
establishments; convenience stores and gas stations feared that their lottery ticket customers would begin 
purchasing their tickets from home; and athletic organizations, both professional and collegiate, opposed all 
betting in general because of the potentially disastrous effects that it would have on the integrity of sports.243 
Anti-gambling groups and individuals worried that legitimate and legal Internet gambling would allow 
addicted gamblers and children using their parents’ credit cards to bankrupt themselves and their families via 
home computers.244 One authority on problem and pathological gambling suggested that the “young, affluent 
males,” who already composed much of the Internet’s population, comprised the demographic that “we know 
from research are probably most likely to develop difficulties related to gambling.”245 
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The gambling industry sometimes tried to draw parallels to developed countries such as Australia, England, 
Germany, New Zealand, and South Africa, which, as of 2000, had either sanctioned Internet gambling or were 
contemplating doing so.246 Opponents countered that those countries were misled by industry public relations 
efforts and that invalid economics were still invalid, regardless of which countries were making the mistakes.247 
In any event, the U.S. government deemed it important to consider its own citizens’ best interests when 
determining which course of action to take, and in 1999 the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
recommended a de facto criminalization of all gambling via the Internet.248 South Dakota Attorney General 
Mark Barnett summarized the majority opinion of his colleagues when he concluded that “[t]he fact is it’s bad 
news from start to finish.”249 Barnett highlighted his colleagues’ opinions and the National Association of 
Attorneys General opinion, stating, “In our view, there is not a single upside to Internet gambling, and we think 
it’s worth a [prosecutorial] challenge.”250 
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PART V 
Trends and Conditioning Factors 
A. Advertising and Marketing of Internet Gambling 
While 18 U.S.C. § 1084251 expressly prohibited the use of wire communication facilities for the use of 
transmitting information relating to wagering,252 illegal bookmaking, according to the Nevada Gaming 
Commission, was still approximately an $80 billion to $100 billion per year business in the United States in 
1999.253 Furthermore, law enforcement agencies estimated that $2.5 billion was wagered on the NCAA 
tournament championship game in 1995 alone.254 With these kinds of numbers, it was obvious that U.S. illegal 
bookmaking was a widespread and lucrative business. When coupled with the Internet’s wide reach, appeal, and 
accessibility, such gambling activities could easily spiral out of the control of both the regulatory agencies and 
the gamblers themselves. 
Internet gambling Web sites obviously generated more money for themselves if they could successfully 
“hook in” inexperienced gamblers and Web surfers.255 Accordingly, many Web sites were carefully and subtly 
arranged to “make it look as though you’re simply playing a game.”256 Ohio Attorney General Betty 
Montgomery spent time investigating some of the nearly 300 online casinos that her staff discovered on the 
Internet.257 “It all feels just like a video game,” she complained, adding that this marketing made it easy for the 
player to ignore the fact that real money was at stake.258 
In a related scenario, the president of dot com Entertainment Group, Inc. optimistically hoped for a Web 
site that would allow players in North America to play a bingo game online called CyberBingo (in English, 
French, or Spanish) linked with players from Germany, Japan, and other countries around the world.259 He 
hoped to replicate the amicable atmosphere of bingo halls by allowing players to play and talk to one another 
simultaneously in a chat room.260 
Although casino gambling was still illegal in Israel in 1999, another company looking to profit from the 
international appeal of offshore Internet gambling was Israel’s PrincessNET Technologies and Software Ltd., 
which its founders claimed was being heavily marketed toward those Internet users fond of games, not big 
spenders.261 PrincessNET’s online gambling site was called Bet&Chat, in the hope that the option of chatting 
with other players while gambling would attract customers.262 Players were even offered the ability to register 
according to their nationalities in order to “sit” together with other players at “tables” and chat while 
gambling.263 
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Another marketing strategy that Internet gambling sites hoped to employ successfully involved creating 
partnerships with prominent non-gambling Internet-related companies.264 Kerry Packer, Australia’s wealthiest 
man, envisioned one such attempt in 1999.265 He owned a controlling share in Publishing & Broadcasting Ltd. 
(“PBL”), which operated numerous Australian communications media outlets, including television stations, 
broadcasting companies, newspapers, and magazines, as well as the Australian Internet portal Web site, 
NineMSN (“ninemsn.com2”), in an equal partnership with U.S. based Microsoft.266 PBL also announced that it 
was going to acquire Crown Ltd., the parent company of Melbourne’s sole licensed casino.267 This acquisition 
was fostered in a reported attempt to corner the market for Internet gambling.268 Although Microsoft 
spokespeople declined to comment on the matter, Bill Gates had previously mentioned an interest in Internet 
gambling in his book, The Road Ahead, published in 1995.269 Gates wrote that “[g]ambling is a highly regulated 
industry, and we can’t be sure what kinds will be allowed on the Net, or what the rules will be.”270 Yet he 
concluded it was certain that “[t]he global interactive network [of the future] will make gambling far more 
difficult to control than it is today.”271 
B. The Impacts and Dangers of Internet Gambling on Children, Teenagers, and College Students 
One of the most pressing concerns regarding the development of easily accessible Internet gambling involved 
the impossibility of Web sites, even those Web sites acting in good faith, to verify that the user was of legal age 
to gamble. This situation suggested dangerous possibilities that children were going to begin gambling on the 
Internet. In an effort to demonstrate the ease with which a child could access an online casino, the 1996 
president of CORE Capital Management, one of the pioneers of the Internet gambling community, conducted a 
demonstration for U.S. News and World Report.272 First, he easily accessed a British Web site specializing in 
sports wagers, and then he easily completed a form stating that he was 18 or older and was “not using the 
software to encourage others to play.”273 After completing the form, he was issued a user name and asked to 
select a password, at which point he was given a list of upcoming wagering opportunities and it was “child’s 
play” from there.274 
While a criminal justice professor at Illinois State University, Henry Lesieur explained that since there 
were virtually no controls in place to verify the age and competency of the user, anyone with a credit card and a 
minimal amount of Internet savvy could gamble online. “There’s no way to stop teenagers,”275 according to 
Professor Lesieur. “My God, they’re already hacking into the Pentagon.”276 The availability to children posed a 
very serious problem, since experts believed that Internet gambling could be very appealing to teenagers, a 
demographic market segment “already fond of video games as well as being especially prone to becoming 
addicted.”277 These factors were of particular concern given the results of a study by Dr. Howard Shaffer of 
Harvard Medical School.278 One of his studies found a quickly increasing incidence of problem gambling in 
                                                           
264 See Barton Crockett, U.S. Companies Eye Web Casinos in Australia (Feb. 10, 1999) (on file with author). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 See Jim Impoco, Laying Off Bets on the Internet: Computers vs. Casinos, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 
60, available at 1996 WL 7810064. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. (quotations added). 
275 Lambrecht, supra note 107. 
276 Id. 
277 LaTessa, supra note 89. 
278 See Tomorrow Never Dies, supra note 69. 
Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of National and International Economies 27 
adolescent populations,279 and he concluded that during the 1990s gambling addiction was the “fastest growing” 
teenage addiction—surpassing drug addiction.280 
In addition, growing beyond adolescence was not a panacea for avoiding gambling addictions. U.S. Census 
Statistics reported that people between the ages of 18 and 24 also exhibited the most threatening form of 
gambling disorders (i.e., pathological/addicted gambling) at a level between two and three times greater than 
that of the remaining adult population.281 Census Bureau statistics also revealed that between 8% and 20% of all 
college students surveyed had previously dealt with a gambling problem.282 
When evaluating Internet gambling as it interfaces with these sobering statistics of gambling problems 
among college students, the deleterious effects become even more obvious. By 1999, research indicated that a 
majority of college students had ready access to computers and the Internet and also owned credit cards.283 
These components synergized to provide all of the elements necessary for students to gamble on the Internet via 
offshore casinos. Officials became concerned that the Internet was cultivating deleterious gambling habits and 
problems in the secrecy of dormitory rooms, where problems could develop rapidly without anyone else 
knowing about them until it was too late.284 For example, 19-year-old Jason Berg became addicted to regular 
casino-style gambling, including electronic gambling devices, lost his tuition and savings money, and 
committed suicide.285 Despondent over Jason’s suicide, his stepfather committed suicide two and a-half years 
later.286 Experts extrapolated that if regular casino-style gambling was addictive to students, a fortiori Internet 
gambling was more addictive, particularly to the “Nintendo generation.”287 
According to one college student, the attraction to Internet gambling was quite tempting to students and 
difficult to resist: 
College students are often attracted to the convenience and numerous gaming options that 
online gambling has to offer….There is a great variety of the different sports you could 
gamble on with online gambling….It also helps me with bills….Once they are out of the way, 
I am not going to do it anymore.288 
This potentially devastating influence was particularly frightening to the parents of college students. “You 
send your daughter to college and are aware of date rape and binge drinking,” said Washington, D.C. NCAA 
lobbyist Daniel Nestle in 1999.289 “Now there is another addiction, but it doesn’t seem to be on the radar 
screen.”290 The developing trend of Internet gambling among college students also alarmed Michael Frank, an 
expert on underage gambling and a psychologist at Richard Stockton College in Pomona, New Jersey.291 He 
explained: “If I play poker with friends and lose $100, my rent gets paid and my children still have food. I’m 
not sure the same thing can be said of college students.”292 One Harvard graduate student, in an interview with 
CNN, summarized the fascination with Internet gambling: “You have this expectation of potentially making 
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money, which is thrilling for someone like me.”293 From inside the comforts of his dormitory room, this student 
and his peers wagered up to $1,000 a day on various sporting events, such as college basketball games.294 
C. The Impact of Internet Gambling on Collegiate and Professional Sports 
Within their jurisdictions, the NCAA and the professional sporting leagues outlawed betting on games 
throughout much of their histories in efforts to preserve the integrity and honesty of the competitions.295 Due to 
betting and point-shaving scandals during the 1990s, for example, at Arizona State, Northwestern University, 
and Boston College, athletic officials were increasingly concerned that gambling interests were threatening 
sporting events.296 
Another threat involved the confusion among adolescents fueled by the widespread but disingenuous 
gambling advertisements by state governments.297 Most state governments utilize taxpayer dollars to market 
various gambling activities as not just “acceptable,” but “smart” and even “patriotic.”298 
Every time Bill Saum, the director of agents and gambling for the NCAA, testified under oath during the 
1990s, he referred to a study of 684 men’s football and basketball players in Division I competition conducted 
by the University of Cincinnati.299 The results of this study showed that 25% of the athletes had wagered money 
on games other than their own, 3.7% had admitted to placing bets on their own games, and 0.4% of those 
surveyed—three athletes—had admitted that they had previously received money from a gambler in return for 
not playing well.300 
Alan Kesner, the Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin and the chairman of the committee on Internet 
gambling for the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”), expressed the concern of the U.S. 
Attorney Generals with the development of Internet gambling, pointing out that “[y]ou can keep the bookies out 
of the locker room, but not off of e-mail.”301 
Dean Smith, the winningest coach in the history of college basketball, who retired after 879 victories over 
thirty six seasons as the coach of the University of North Carolina Tarheels, testified before Congress in an 
attempt to outlaw any form of gambling on college sports.302 He was joined by Tubby Smith, the University of 
Kentucky men’s basketball coach as well as Lou Holtz, the football coach for the University of South Carolina, 
who all contended that their players were under a lot of pressure to throw games or to shave points.303 
D. Significant Lawsuits Stemming from Internet Gambling 
Alerted by experts, by Congressional hearings during the 1990s, and finally by the 1999 NGISC Executive 
Summary,304 savvy credit card companies and financial institutions cut off their customers from gambling Web 
sites.305 As predicted, Internet gambling debts were stinging the uninformed companies in well-publicized cases 
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at the close of the twentieth century. In one lawsuit that could potentially cause the de facto end of Internet 
gambling, Providian v. Haines,306 Ms. Haines accumulated over $70,000 in debt on twelve credit cards used at 
Internet gambling websites.307 She filed suit to avoid paying the credit card debts, claiming that since gambling 
over the Internet was illegal, the credit card companies should not bind her to her debts.308 The fact that she 
could win her case seriously jeopardizes the income and future of Internet gambling Web sites.309 Another 
significant suit was pending in 2000 against American Express Co., Visa International, and MasterCard 
International, Ltd., filed by a number of people who lost money to Internet gambling sites and used credit cards 
to pay off their debts.310 This suit also had the potential of eventually becoming a class action, wherein 
“hundreds of thousands” of online gamblers could join as parties to the suit.311 
In 2000, one plaintiff sued the West Virginia Music and Vending Association for supporting the video 
poker industry, Derrick Music Company the owner of the video poker machines in question, and the 
convenience store that kept the video poker machines.312 The plaintiff named these defendants for their role in 
allegedly leading a man to become a pathological (addicted) gambler as a result of playing the identified video 
poker machines and losing a substantial amount of money.313 
In addition, in December 1997, Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth pressured Western Union into 
refusing to service many offshore Internet gambling companies.314 This development could have seriously 
affected many of these gambling businesses because of their reliance on Western Union as a conduit for many 
of their financial transactions.315 When questioned about the effectiveness of the move, Internet gambling Web 
site operators claimed that the ban constituted only an inconvenience and that they would simply rely more 
heavily upon overnight mail, cashier’s checks, and bank wires.316 However, after only a week of the ban, 
Western Union re-established its business with the Internet gambling Web sites, reportedly because they were 
so lucrative.317
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PART VI 
Policy Alternatives and Recommendations 
A. Policy Arguments 
In 1996, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III concluded that government officials needed to 
demystify and debunk the widely popularized notion of the Internet as the Wild West, where there was no form 
of law enforcement.318 He noted that just as the Wild West ultimately required the rule of law to advance and 
prosper, the international territory of the Internet needed the same type of regulation in order to inspire total 
confidence from its users to reach its fullest social and business potential.319 
Opponents of regulating Internet gambling argued that as a practical matter, a handful of government 
bureaucrats would not succeed in regulating the Internet, which was designed to allow the computers of the 
world to maintain communication with one another in the event of a world-wide catastrophe such as nuclear 
war.320 However, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General Alan Kesner concluded that just because the task of 
Internet regulation was inherently difficult, did not automatically mean that adopting a policy banning gambling 
from the Internet was inappropriate.321 He emphasized that it was not a reasonable approach for the government 
to allow activity on the Internet that it did not permit in the real world.322 Jeremiah “Jay” Nixon, the Missouri 
Attorney General, paralleled this point of view in the context of responding to Native American Internet 
gambling proponents in 1997 who suggested that their supposedly illegal Internet gambling revenues could be 
taxed in order to generate funds for public use.323 Attorney General Nixon asked: “Are they saying that just 
because the proceeds from a bank robbery go to some purported public purpose that we should allow it to 
occur?”324 The Missouri Attorney General’s office effectively suppressed this Native American Internet 
gambling operation.325 
Another argument often utilized by the Internet gambling interests involved the invalid and pejorative 
comparison of gambling to the prohibition of alcohol. The argument focused on the fact that prohibition only 
pushed the taboo underground, where the same people who wanted the substance or service in question would 
obtain it despite its illegality, just without the benefit of governmental regulation.326 This logic was flawed in 
several respects. Since gambling was legal in many forms in many states, those who wished to engage in it 
could still do so, under some degree of regulatory supervision. Furthermore, all that a ban on Internet gambling 
would do was prevent people from gambling in their homes, offices, and schools, as well as prevent minors 
from gambling illegally. Additionally, it was argued that for the same reasons that there were laws preventing 
minors from obtaining alcohol (while adults could still obtain it), Internet gambling should be prohibited. 
In summary, the only group that had a potentially valid interest in preventing a ban on Internet gambling 
sites was the Internet service providers, who argued that they would be thrust into the role of a regulatory force 
on the Internet by blocking objectionable sites.327 This role had worked reasonably well during the 1990s in 
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other countries. For example, Germany effectively regulated pornographic and neo-Nazi Web sites.328 U.S. 
service providers, however, argued that they did not wish to engage in blocking Internet gambling sites and 
were incapable of doing so effectively.329 
B. Legislative and Regulatory Efforts 
The efforts of lawmakers during the late 1990s to enact legislation rendering Internet gambling illegal met with 
much resistance. A House bill sponsored by U.S. Representative Robert Goodlatte (R-Va.), which would have 
banned many forms of gambling from the Internet, won a majority of the House vote in 2000, but failed to 
attain the required procedural two-thirds vote necessary for passage. 330 Representative Goodlatte urged its 
passage by likening Internet gambling to child pornography: “Just like child pornography has to be dealt with 
on the Internet, so does unregulated, out-of-control, illegal gambling.”331 The Senate voted in favor of similar 
legislation in 1999 with a bill sponsored by U.S. Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.).332 The bill sought to modernize the 
1961 Wire Communication Act to apply to the Internet; however, it lapsed because similar legislation failed in 
the House.333 
Subsequent legislation in the 107th Congress included H.R. 3215, the Combating Illegal Gambling Reform 
and Modernization Act, sponsored by U.S. Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.).334 Even provisions of H.R. 
3004, the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, sponsored by U.S. Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio),335 
were subsequently incorporated as Title III in H.R. 3162, the International Money Laundering Abatement and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (contained in the USA PATRIOT Act),336 in an effort to prevent Internet 
gambling from being used as a device to launder money to terrorist organizations.337 Congress enacted the USA 
PATRIOT Act immediately in response to the events of September 11, 2001.338 
C. Possible Solutions 
In 1996, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III suggested that state computer crime laws could 
be strengthened in order to combat fraud committed by Internet gambling sites by simply applying existing 
criminal and consumer fraud statutes covering advertising in other formats to the Internet.339 Thus, the first 
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possible solution would have been to transfer law created for one medium to another and utilize preexisting 
statutory resources. 
A second possible method would have been to allow only Internet gambling sites based in the United States 
to market and operate in foreign jurisdictions that permitted such activities.340 In 1998, Gambling Technologies 
Holdings Corp. (“G-TECH”), the largest lottery firm in the world, planned to pursue this tactic with its Internet 
based lottery games, via software that would prevent Americans from accessing its gambling sites.341 However, 
demonstrating the general regulatory problems in any gambling activity, in 2000 G-TECH was threatened with 
the loss of the largest lottery contract, the U.K. lottery, when Britain’s regulatory commission revealed concerns 
over G-TECH’s “secretive behavior,” announcing that the commission “remains extremely concerned about the 
behavior of G-[TECH].”342 Even so, the company thereafter succeeded in retaining the U.K. account.343 
A third policy would have been to attempt to forge an international agreement regarding the rules and 
regulations of Internet gambling worldwide.344 However, the net economic effect of such a treaty would be to 
make poor countries poorer, destabilize their financial infrastructure, and create new governmental 
corruption.345 
The only workable solution appeared to be a total prohibition against cyberspace gambling, including 
Internet gambling, via not only a multilateral U.N. Treaty, but also bilateral treaties or amendments to existing 
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (“FCN” treaties).346 
Ironically, one final method to prevent the proliferation of Internet gambling would have been to leave it 
completely unregulated.347 According to a consultant for Christiansen Cummings Associates, Inc., a New York 
consulting firm for the gambling industry, “With on-line casino games, you’re never really sure if the game is 
rigged or not.”348 Therefore, if Internet gambling Web sites developed a bad reputation for cheating their 
customers or reneged on their promised winnings, theoretically, online gamblers would eventually realize that 
gambling on the Internet was a losing proposition.349 However, such a libertarian self-learning experience 
should be avoided in the nuclear interdependent world, because these interests would be outweighed by the 
extent of the socio-economic trauma, which could and probably would occur to financial systems and 
concomitant governmental national security interests. 
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PART VII 
Conclusion 
 
Utilizing the basic McDougal/Lasswell methodology of policy-oriented jurisprudence and applying these 
methods to the issues involving Internet gambling revealed that only a policy of “totally banning” Internet 
gambling was practically feasible. Exceptions eventually led to wide-open Internet gambling and an 
overwhelming litany of economic ills and social consequences—increased addicted gamblers, bankruptcies, and 
crime and corruption. 
Accordingly, all cyberspace and Internet gambling needs to be banned domestically in the United States 
and prohibited internationally by a United Nations multinational treaty. Implementing this policy is essential 
because of Internet gambling’s very real potential to destabilize regional, national, and even global financial 
systems and economies. 
